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I. Introduction  
Over the last two decades or so, both developed and developing countries alike have endured severe 
banking crises. The U.S. Savings and Loan debacle in the early 1980s, the Latin American banking 
crisis in the mid 1980s, the Mexican upheaval in the 1990s and more recently, the financial stress in 
East Asian economies and subsequently, in Argentina and Turkey are only a few examples. The costs 
of such crises have often been large, ranging from a modest 3 per cent of GDP for the US S&L crisis 
to around 35 per cent of GDP for Thailand and a much higher 55 per cent of GDP for Indonesia 
during the period 1997-99 (Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003). At all times and, particularly, in order to 
avoid banking crises, authorities need to find ways to promote prudent behaviour by banks. A typical 
way to address the issue is to tighten prudential supervision (Mishkin, 2001). Alternately, rather than 
depending on regulatory action alone, banking authorities can supplement the same by increasing 
their reliance on market discipline to reinforce oversight of banks. 
Market discipline in the banking sector can be described as ‘private counterparty supervision’ 
(Greenspan, 2001). Such discipline usually takes one of two forms: direct discipline and indirect 
discipline (Federal Reserve, 2000). Direct market discipline is the pressure applied by investors on banks 
through the interest rate paid (e.g., through sub-ordinated debt), which, in turn, reflects each bank’s 
risk profile. The higher the risk profile, the higher would be the interest rate paid. Banks are 
therefore, not only ‘punished’ for maintaining high risk profiles, but the ex-ante anticipation of higher 
funding costs act as a deterrent on risk-taking behaviour. Illustratively, in Argentina, supervisory 
authorities require banks to issue 2 per cent of their deposits as marketable debt securities, with a 
minimum maturity of two years (Calomiris and Powell, 2001). This has prompted Benink and 
Calomiris (1999) to suggest making the issuance of sub-ordinated debt with minimum two-year 
maturity (and a contingency clause terminating it in the event of a bailout) mandatory for large banks. 
As an alternate possibility, uninsured depositors, who feel susceptible to excessive risk-taking, may 
penalize riskier banks by withdrawing their deposits from such banks. Indirect market discipline, on the 
other hand, is the pressure applied by regulators on the basis of sub-ordinated debt prices in the 
secondary market. To the extent that such prices reflect the (absolute or relative) probability of loss 
by issuing banks, they can provide valuable input into decisions by supervisors and counter-parties 
affecting the bank. For example, the frequency and intensity of on- and off-site supervision, 
supervisory ratings, bank-specific capital requirements and corrective measures could in part be based   2
on rates paid on sub-ordinated debt. Through the (price) signals on sub-ordinated debt, investors can 
assist supervisors assess the condition of issuing banks.  
As the South-East Asian crisis testifies, the disciplining role of the markets (including the 
inter-bank market) was particularly weak in the crisis-hit countries. This was due predominantly to 
the lack of disclosure and transparency of banks and to the fact that limited reliance could be placed 
on the quality of accountancy data provided in bank accounts. Market discipline is however, not an 
issue for developed countries alone. Nakaso et al. (2000), for instance, argue that market discipline did 
not operate efficiently in Japan due largely to insufficient financial infrastructure (weak accountancy 
rules, inadequate disclosure standards, etc). Even for the U.S., where market discipline is arguably the 
strongest, evidence suggests that neither supervisors nor rating agencies nor equity investors are 
unambiguously more timely and accurate in their assessment of risk than others. All three groups 
produce valuable complementary information that contributes towards improving the performance 
of large banks (Berger et al., 2000). 
  There are a number of potential benefits from enhancing market discipline in a country’s 
banking sector. First, by punishing excessive risk-taking by banks, increased market discipline may 
reduce moral hazard incentives. Second, market discipline may improve the efficiency of banks by 
pressurizing some of the relatively inefficient banks to become more efficient or to exit the industry 
(Berger, 1991). Third, evidence indicates that markets give signals about the credit standings of 
financial firms, which, combined with inside information gained by supervisory procedures, can 
increase the efficacy of the overall supervisory process. Flannery (1998), for instance, suggests that 
market information may improve two features of the overall process for regulators by (a) enabling 
them to identify incipient problems more promptly, and (b) providing them an incentive and 
justification to take action more quickly, once problems have been identified. He concludes that 
market information should be incorporated into the process of identifying and correcting problems. 
Finally, market discipline might be able to supplement traditional supervisory assessments to 
distinguish ‘good’ banks from ‘bad’ ones and therefore, lower overall social costs of bank supervision 
(Flannery, 2001). Even the proposed capital Accord of the Basel Committee has designated market 
discipline as one of the three pillars on which future financial regulation should be based, because 
‘[market] discipline imposes strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and 
efficient manner” and expects that the approach ‘will encourage high disclosure standards and 
enhance the role of market participants in encouraging banks to hold adequate capital’ (Basel, 1999). 
The potential benefits of market discipline could be particularly important in developing 
economies. This is primarily because financial systems in these economies tend to be predominantly 
bank-based. Accordingly, in view of the overwhelming dominance of banks, it is widely believed that 
a well-functioning banking system can play a significant role in efficient allocation of savings.   3
However, in view of the growing complexity of banking organizations, traditional procedures of 
supervision can, at best, have limited appeal. As a consequence, considerable interest has been 
generated in recent times in harnessing market forces to assist regulatory goals.  
The present study focuses on Indian banking sector as a case study. A number of factors 
make the banking sector in India an interesting case to study market discipline. First, in the last 
decade, India has undergone a liberalisation of the banking sector with the avowed objective of 
‘enhancing efficiency, productivity and profitability’ (RBI, 1991). Second, the banking sector 
witnessed important transformation, driven by the need for ‘creating a market-driven, productive and 
competitive economy’ in order to ‘support higher investment levels and accentuate growth’ 
(Government of India, 1998) through prescription of prudential norms and reorientation in the 
regulatory framework in line with international best practices. Finally, it seems appropriate to 
conduct a study of market discipline for India, since it has made significant efforts to promote the 
role of market forces in regulating banks. Illustratively, over the last few years, bank supervisors have 
undertaken steps towards improving the quality and availability of information on banks. Banks are 
presently required to disclose, among others, not only their capital adequacy (tier I and tier II, 
separately) ratios, net NPA to net advances, return on assets and government holdings, but also the 
amount of sub-ordinated debt raised as tier II capital, movements in NPAs, maturity pattern of 
deposits and borrowings and lending to sensitive sectors. These have recently been enlarged to 
encompass disclosures on movements in provisions held towards (a) NPAs and (b) depreciation in 
investment portfolio, effective March 31, 2002. The importance of market discipline has being 
recognised by the Reserve Bank wherein it has been observed that “processes of transparency and 
market disclosure of critical information describing the risk profile, capital structure and capital 
adequacy are assuming increasing importance in the emerging environment. Besides making banks 
more accountable and responsive to better-informed investors, these processes enable banks to strike 
the right balance between risks and rewards and to improve the access to markets. Improvements in 
market discipline also call for greater coordination between banks and regulators” (Jalan, 2002). 
Towards this end, we estimate reduced-form equations of individual bank deposits/interest paid on 
deposits as functions of bank fundamentals, banking industry-level and macroeconomic variables. In 
particular, we consider two specific aspects of market discipline, viz., (a) do bank fundamentals 
influence depositor willingness to entrust deposits at a particular bank? and, (b) do differences among 
bank groups affect the degree of market discipline in the banking sector?  
  The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents an overview of the 
literature on market discipline. Section III describes the empirical methodology used in the study. 
Section IV provides a description of the data. Section V presents and discusses the empirical results. 
Does the existence of deposit insurance or alternately, dilution of Government stake in public sector   4
banks influence market discipline? These issues are addressed in Section VI. Finally, the concluding 
remarks are gathered in Section VII.  
 
II. Literature On Market Discipline 
  The majority of the existing studies on market discipline pertain to the US commercial 
banking industry over the last two decades. These studies have primarily followed three different 
approaches. The first set of studies have chosen the price-(or yield) based approach. In particular, 
they employ yield spreads (the difference between the market yield on bank debt and a risk-free asset 
like Government paper) as an indicator of the market’s perception of bank risk. Studies along this 
line include those by Baer and Brewer (1986), Ellis and Flannery (1992), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), 
Jagtiani and Lemieux (2000) and Sironi (2000); the first four pertaining to US and the final one 
relating to the European banking industry. Overall, these studies support the hypothesis that yields 
on uninsured deposits contain risk premia. This, in effect, implies that uninsured depositors charge 
higher interest rates to riskier banks.  
  A second set of studies adopts the quantity-based approach, by analyzing to what extent a 
bank is able to raise (uninsured) debt. Covitz et al. (2000) find that relatively weak banks are unwilling 
(or unable) to issue sub-ordinated debt in bad times. Jordan (2000) finds that, in the 1990’s, New 
England banks experienced a fall in uninsured deposits prior to failing. As a case study of market 
discipline in Colombia, Barajas and Steiner (2000) find that depositors prefer banks with stronger 
fundamentals and that banks tend to improve their fundamentals after being ‘punished’ by 
depositors. Birchler and Maechler (2001), examining market discipline in the Swiss banking sector, 
find that depositors are sensitive to bank-specific fundamentals and to institutional changes in the 
Swiss depositor protection system. Finally, Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) observe for 
Argentina, Chile and Mexico, that even small, insured depositors exert market discipline by 
withdrawing deposits from weak banks.  
  The final set of studies combine both the price- and quantity-based approaches. These 
papers (Park, 1995; Park and Peristiani, 1998; Calomiris and Powell, 2000) examine market discipline 
by looking at the effect of depository’s institution risk on both the pricing and growth of uninsured 
deposits. Overall, these studies find that riskier banks pay higher interest rates, but, at the same time, 
attract smaller amounts of uninsured deposits.  
  Despite its potential advantages, market discipline can only complement, not supplant 
supervision. Market discipline and supervision are not substitutes because the stake of the 
government and the market participants in the financial system are not perfectly aligned. As observed 
by Llewellyn (2001), markets are concerned with the private costs of bank failures and the risk arising   5
thereon is reflected in market prices. The social costs of bank failure may exceed the private cost 
which may not be fully reflected in market prices. 
  Thus, while there are clear limitations of the usefulness of market discipline, the global trend 
is towards placing increased emphasis on market data in the supervisory process. The idea is not that 
market monitoring can effectively replace official supervision, but that it has a potentially powerful 
role within the overall regulatory regime. In particular, it has the advantage of exploiting the synergies 
between supervision and market discipline and thereby increasing the efficacy of the overall 
supervisory process. In this context, Caprio and Honohan (1998) aver that, ‘broader approaches to 
bank supervision reach beyond the issues of defining capital and accounting standards, and envisage 
co-opting other market participants by giving them a greater stake in bank survival. This approach 
increases the likelihood that problems will be detected earlier…[it involves] broadening the number 
of those who are directly concerned about keeping the banks safe and sound’. 
III. Empirical Methodology 
This section is devoted to a discussion of the empirical methodology employed to study 
market discipline. As mentioned earlier, we hypothesize that the dependent variable in the study, 
which signifies the existence or otherwise of market discipline depends on three sets of variables: (a) 
bank-specific; (b) banking industry-level; and, (c) macroeconomic. Towards this end, we estimate the 
following reduced form equation for the dependent variable: 
such that i=1,2,…,N (number of banks) and t=1,2,…,T (number of time periods). 
In equation (1), DEPVAR represents the individual bank-specific dependent variable. The 
panel is balanced, so T is the number of observations per bank. SYS stands for the systemic (or bank 
industry specific) variable, while MACRO is a vector of macroeconomic variables. Both the systemic 
and macroeconomic variables change over time, but not across banks. BANKi,t-1 is a vector of bank-
specific variables. This vector is included with a lag, to account for the fact that balance sheet 
information is available to the public with a certain delay. This lag structure also takes care of the 
problem of endogeneity. µi is the bank-specific or fixed effect. Thus, according to equation (1), the 
dependent variable is determined by three major factors: the behaviour of deposits in the overall 
banking system, the developments in the macro-economy and the evolution of bank-risk 
characteristics.  
  The question arises as regards the choice of dependent variable. As our earlier discussion 
reveals, depositors can exercise market discipline on banks through two channels: by requiring higher 
interest rates (price variable) and/or by withdrawing their deposits from riskier banks (quantity 
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variable). The approach adopted in the present paper focuses on both the quantity and price 
approaches.  
In case of the quantity variable, DEPVAR represents the first difference of the log of time 
deposits held by bank i at time t. We consider time deposits since this represents the more stable 
component of aggregate deposits. In public sector banks, time deposits as proportion of aggregate 
deposits constitute anywhere between 55-65 per cent; the figure is much higher at around 75 per cent 
in case of foreign banks and stands at around 70 per cent in case of private banks. In case of the price 
variable, the only calculable interest rate is an implicit rate, rather than a market rate. The reason is 
that banks do not pay a single deposit rate. Indeed, on any particular day, every bank offers a 
multitude of rates, depending on classes of customers and types of products the bank supplies. This 
implicit rate is calculated as the interest paid on deposits to total deposits.  
In developing country markets in particular, the quantity variable often proves to be a better 
indicator of market discipline. Two reasons can be advanced in support of the same. First, under 
situations of asymmetric information, which is often quite pervasive in developing market 
economies, a debtor is rationed by quantity rather than price (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Differences 
in yields may therefore underestimate the presence of market discipline. Second, while the quantity 
variable is readily obtainable, the appropriate price variable is not readily available. This calls for 
approximating the price variable via some proxy as described above. This proxy does not allow us to 
discriminate across maturity or size of deposits, and moreover, it is a crude indicator of the market 
discipline exerted on banks through the price mechanism. However, for sake of completeness, we 
also include the price variable as an indicator of market discipline. Accordingly, examining whether 
riskier banks attract lower deposits or alternately, provide higher interest rates on deposits provides a 
comprehensive test of the existence and the degree of market discipline.  
 
IV. The Dataset And Variables 
  Three types of data are used in this study: viz, bank-specific, systemic and macroeconomic 
variables. The bank-specific data used in the study have been culled out from the Report on Trend and 
Progress of Banking in India and Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India. Macroeconomic and systemic 
data come both the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy as well as from the International Financial 
Statistics of the IMF. Bank-specific data are on an annual basis and comprises of a common set of 72 
banks for which consistent data is available over the period 1995-96 through 2001-02. The choice of 
the period of study can be justified on the ground that it is the period for which data on the relevant 
variables are available on a consistent basis. More importantly, although the reforms in the banking 
sector were initiated in 1992-93, the effect of competitive pressures tended to manifest themselves 
only much later. This argument finds support in the work of Sarkar and Bhaumik (1998) who   7
concluded that as of 1994-95, the deregulation of entry had not notably impacted the extent of 
competition in the Indian banking sector. It, therefore, seems reasonable to focus on the period 1996 
through 2002 for the purpose of the study. Given the way the quantity variable is constructed, our 
analysis for the said variable pertains to the period 1996-97 through 2001-02. 
 
IV.A Bank-specific Variables  
  The vector BANKi,t-1 contains several banks-specific fundamentals which are intended to 
measure bank’s risk exposure. The variables are derived from the CAMEL rating system of banks 
(where the acronym CAMEL stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and 
Liquidity).  
Capital Adequacy Capital adequacy is measured by the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets 
(CRAR). As a sound capital base should strengthen depositor confidence, we expect the capital 
adequacy variable to exert a positive influence on bank deposits and a lower interest outgo.  
Asset Quality A clear signal of asset quality is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
(GNPA). We employ the gross non-performing loans to gross advances ratio, which is more 
indicative of the quality of credit decisions made by bankers. As higher GNPA is indicative of poor 
credit decision-making, we expect this variable to have a negative influence on deposits and an 
adverse outcome in terms of higher interest rates.  
Management  To account for management quality, we include the ratio of non-interest 
expenditures to total assets (MGNT). This variable, which includes a variety of expenses, such as 
payroll, workers compensation and training investment, reflects the management policy stance. A 
high level of expenditures in not-directly productive activities may reflect an inefficient management. 
We expect this variable to have a negative relationship with deposits and a positive linkage with the 
interest rate variable. 
Earnings  We measure bank earnings (EARN) by the return on asset ratio. In general, 
assuming we are adequately controlling for risk, we expect this variable to have a positive effect on 
deposits and an inverse relation with interest rate.  
Liquidity The cash plus balances with central bank to total asset ratio (LQD) is included as an 
indicator of bank liquidity. In general, banks with a larger volume of liquid assets are perceived to be 
safer, since these assets would allow banks to meet unexpected withdrawals. This would imply a 
positive relation between deposits and liquidity and a negative movement between liquidity and 
interest rate.  
In order to control for the size of the bank, the natural logarithm of bank asset (SIZE) is 
included in the regression to examine whether depositors respond to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ effect.  
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IV.B Bank-industry Specific Variables  
  In order to control for the behaviour of the overall banking sector, our estimations include 
the ratio of cash outside banks to system deposits (CASH). This variable provides a preliminary way 
of testing for contagion effects. Contagion refers to a situation in which individual depositors at a 
given bank act according to what the rest of the banking system appears to be doing, after controlling 
for bank-specific and macroeconomic factors. CASH reflects the individual preference for holding 
currency relative to bank deposits. If depositors perceive an increase in systemic risks, they might 
decide to withdraw their deposit from banks, regardless of bank fundamentals. The value of cash 
outside banks over system deposits will increase and individual bank deposits will fall. Therefore, a 
negative correlation between individual bank deposits and CASH can be interpreted as evidence of 
contagion effects. A reverse argument holds between the interest rate variable and CASH.  
  Secondly, we include a policy variable (POLICY) indicating specific years when important 
liberalisation measures were undertaken. Accordingly, we assign a dummy variable which assumes 
value 1, if important policy measures were undertaken in that year and zero, otherwise. From the 
point of view of the present exercise, we are concerned with important policy measures that are 
expected to impinge upon deposits. Illustratively, from the policy standpoint, during 1996-97, the 
Bank Rate (the rate at which the central bank provides refinance to commercial banks) emerged as a 
signaling rate and all important interest rates in the system were linked to it. Over the course of the 
year, the Bank Rate was reduced across the board. This would, expectedly impinge upon deposits as 
well. As a consequence, we assign a dummy value 1 during 1996-97. Similar dummy values are 
assigned during the other years when important policy measures impinging on deposits were 
undertaken.  
 
IV.C Macroeconomic Variables  
  Deposits at individual banks or the price paid on deposits can also be influenced by the state 
of the overall economy. Thus, we control for the impact of macroeconomic variables. In particular, 
we evaluate the effect of growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDPR) and the consumer price 
index (CPI). As these variables reflect the relative strength of the economy, we expect each having a 
positive relationship with the quantity variable and a negative relation with the price variable. In 
order to ascertain the joint significance of the bank-specific variables, we report the corresponding F-
statistics. This, in effect, enables us to determine the joint significant impact of these variables on 
deposits, even when some of them might not be individually significant. Similar F-statistics are also 
report for the joint significance of macro and system variables are also reported.  
 
V. Empirical Results And Discussion   9
  This section evaluates whether there is evidence of market discipline, in other words, 
whether depositors respond to bank risk-taking by withdrawing deposits and/or by requiring higher 
interest rates on deposits. Table 1 presents the results for the commercial banking sector as a whole.1  
 
 
Table 1: Response of Growth of Deposits and Interest Rate paid on Deposits  
to Bank Risk Characteristics – Commercial Banking System 
Dependent Variable: Time Deposit  Dependent Variable: Interest Rate 
Explanatory Variables  Parameter 
Estimate 
t-value Significance Explanatory Variables  Parameter 
Estimate 
t-value Significance
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Bank-specific    Bank-specific   
Intercept  0.465 0.64 Intercept  16.857 3.28 *
Lag (CRAR)  0.009  1.91 ** Lag (CRAR)  -0.043  -1.22
Lag (GNPA)  -0.002  -0.08 Lag (GNPA)  0.040  2.27 **
Lag (MGNT)  -0.015  -1.56 Lag (MGNT)  0.051  0.76
Lag (EARN)  0.014  1.34 Lag (EARN)  -0.235  -3.25 *
Lag (LQD)  -0.019  -2.63 * Lag (LQD)  -0.099  -1.88 ***
Log (SIZE)  -0.069  -3.56 * Log (SIZE)  -0.031  -0.23
Systemic    Systemic   
CASH 0.233  2.08 ** CASH  -1.208  -1.52
POLICY 0.169  0.67 POLICY  -0.724  -0.40
Macroeconomic     Macroeconomic    
GDPR 0.295  2.16 ** GDPR  -1.575  -1.62
CPI 0.087  3.11 * CPI  -0.374  -1.88
Adjusted R2  0.33 Adjusted  R2  0.39 
F-test fixed effects  1.34  ** F-test fixed effects  1.26  ***
F-test time effects  2.51  ** F-test time effects  1.00 
F-test bank fundamentals  4.02  * F-test  bank 
fundamentals 
3.42 *
No. of banks  72  No. of banks  72 
No. of observations  432  No. of observations  504 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  
The results lend credence to the finding that deposits respond to bank risk taking. Among 
the bank-specific factors, a rise in the CRAR fosters deposit growth. Secondly, banks with relatively 
more liquid assets experience a fall in their deposit base, probably mirroring the fact of holding low 
yielding short-term assets as reflective of poor cash management. Thirdly, the coefficient on the 
SIZE variable is negative and significant at conventional levels, suggesting that larger banks tend to 
witness a fall in their deposit growth. At the bank-industry level, there is limited evidence to support the 
presence of contagion. The coefficient on the CASH variable is positive and significant, alluding to 
the fact that deposits with the entire banking system grew at a slower rate than cash outside banks. 
The rapid growth of cash outside banks might be a consequence of increase in system-wide liquidity 
in the face of declining interest rates on bank deposits and limited alternative avenues for parking of 
funds by depositors. Finally, at the macroeconomic level, higher growth in GDP translates into higher 
                                                 
 
1 ‘Commercial banking sector’ in the analysis consists of scheduled commercial banks, excluding regional rural banks.   10
growth in deposits and the impact is found to be statistically significant. Finally, deposit growth in 
related positively to inflation as proxied by CPI, suggesting that higher uncertainty propels depositors 
to lower their cash holdings and instead, keep their money in deposits. The F-test reveals that bank-
specific factors are jointly significant at 1 per cent level.2 
The results pertaining to the interest rate variable also paint a similar story. Banks with 
higher non-performing loans and lower earnings pay higher interest rates. Thus, banks with poor 
asset quality and limited earning capacity end up paying higher implicit price. Also, banks with lower 
liquidity pay higher interest rates on deposits, attesting to the fact that liquidity profile of banks acts 
as a crucial indicator of market discipline. The table also shows that bank risk characteristics are 
jointly significant in the price equation, even after controlling for fixed effects and time effects. This 
lends further support to the existence of market discipline in the banking sector in India. 
The next obvious question which arises is: which factors tend to be more dominant for 
certain bank groups vis-à-vis others?  The answer to this question is exhibited in Tables 2 and 3. Table 
2 depicts the results for bank groups for the quantity (deposit growth rate) variable, whereas the 
results pertaining to the price variable (interest paid on deposits) is provided in Table 3.   
As Table 2 reveals, for the public sector bank-group, for high capital ratio is associated with 
significantly higher deposit growth, lending credence to this risk-weighted variable in explaining 
depositor behaviour. Among others, poor asset quality and inefficient management practices tends to 
lower deposit growth in the concerned bank, while excessive liquidity also tends to exert a negative 
effect on deposit growth. Since greater liquidity, especially in normal times is often reflective of poor 
cash management, this suggests that comfortable liquidity position in tranquil periods acts as a 
negative signal to depositors about cash management practices of the concerned bank. This supports 
the work of Barajas and Steiner (2000) who, in their study of the Colombian banking system, found 
that higher liquidity in normal times is associated with lower rate of growth of deposits. At the bank-
industry specific level, the coefficient on CASH is positive and significant, hinting at the possibility 
that greater liquidity in the system provides depositors a sense of comfort regarding the safety of their 
deposits, so much so that bank deposits actually rise, rather than fall, as a result. This evidence is not 
consistent with the existence of contagion. It is pertinent to mention here that examining market 
discipline in the Latin American economies of Argentina, Chile and Mexico, Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler (2001) observed that while there was evidence to support the existence of contagion 
effect in the Argentine and Chilean banking system, it was conspicuous by its absence in the Mexican 
banking industry. Finally, higher GDP growth tends to exert a positive influence on deposit growth, 
hinting that the macroeconomic environment has significant effect in explaining depositor behaviour 
                                                 
2 The results with aggregate deposits as the dependent variable are not materially different as that obtained by using time deposits as the dependent variable.   11
in public sector banks.  The F-statistics for bank fundamentals are jointly significant, attesting to the 
existence of market discipline among depositors of public sector banks. 
Table 2: Response of Growth of Deposits to Bank Risk Characteristics –  
Bank Group-wise Analysis  









(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
Bank-specific         
Intercept 0.595  2.13(**)  0.726 2.23(*) 1.261  1.00 
Lag (CRAR)  0.004  1.98(**)  0.010 2.12  (**)  -0.018  -0.78 
Lag (GNPA)  -0.001  -1.26  -0.005  -1.84(**)  0.002  0.48 
Lag (MGNT)  0.028  1.57  -0.039  -1.30  0.014  0.84 
Lag  (EARN)  0.004 0.40  0.006 0.25  0.016  0.35 
Lag (LQD)  -0.007  -1.91(**)  -0.002 -0.35  -0.104  -2.96  (*) 
Log (SIZE)  -0.022  -2.15  -0.037  -2.40 (**)  -0.014  -0.24 
Systemic         
CASH 0.047  1.86(**)  -0.016  -1.30 -0.169  -2.77(*) 
POLICY -0.022  -0.38  0.073  1.78  (**)  -0.055  -0.30 
Macroeconomic          
GDPR  0.063  2.09(**) 0.027  1.61  (***)  0.128 1.61 
CPI  -0.001 -0.96 0.002  1.08  0.012 0.91 
Adjusted R2  0.48   0.35   0.16   
F-test fixed effects  1.95(*)    1.95(**)    1.74(**)   
F-test time effects  1.20    2.56(**)    2.10(**)   
F-test bank fundamentals  2.79(**)    8.39(*)    2.04(***)   
No.  of  banks  27   25   20   
No.  of  observations  162   150   120   
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 
  The results are, however, distinctly different in the case of private and foreign banks. For 
private banks in particular, deposit growth is mostly driven positively by capitalization and negatively 
by non-performing assets to the exclusion of other bank-specific variables. More importantly 
however, systemic and macroeconomic variables play a crucial role in determining deposit growth 
among private banks. In particular, deposit growth responds positively to POLICY, hinting at the 
possibility that depositors with private banks responds pro-actively to a policy announcement. 
Finally, as in the case with public sector banks, deposit growth is driven positively by GDP growth.  
The results for foreign banks, on the other hand, seem to demonstrate that neither of asset 
quality, capital ratio or earnings plays an influential role in harnessing deposit growth. Only liquidity 
plays an important role in influencing deposits, hinting at the possibility that depositors take limited 
cognizance of the overall soundness of foreign banks in entrusting their deposits. Since, more often 
than not, foreign banks mobilise wholesale deposits of high net worth individuals and corporates, it 
seems that profitability of foreign banks is of limited concern for these groups of depositors, possibly 
because they expect these banks to be bailed out by their parent company in case of exigencies. At   12
the bank-industry level, there is evidence to suggest the presence of contagion among the foreign 
bank group as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on CASH.  
Table 3: Response of Interest Paid on Deposits to Bank Risk Characteristics –  
Bank Group-wise Analysis  







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)
Bank-specific    
Intercept  14.214 8.25 (*) 9.386 4.62 (*)  20.975  2.31(**)
Lag (CRAR)  0.011 0.81 -0.142 -4.61 (*)  0.139  0.85
Lag (GNPA)  0.016 2.18(**) 0.002 0.09  -0.063  -1.64 (**)
Lag (MGNT)  -0.463 -4.21 (*) -0.323 -1.70 (***)  -0.009  -0.08
Lag (EARN)  0.013 0.27 0.234 1.66(***)  -0243  -1.90 (**)
Lag (LQD)  -0.043 -2.15(**) -0.049 -1.46  -0.037  -0.15
Log (ASSET)  -0.359 -5.46(*) 0.066 0.70  -0.089  -2.02(**)
Systemic    
CASH 0.424 2.69  (*) -0.068 -0.92  0.162  0.43
POLICY 0.163 0.44 -0.645 -2.73(**)  -0.014  -0.54
Macroeconomic     
GDPR -0.382 -2.07(**) -0.157 -1.61(*)  -0.248  -0.47
CPI -0.095 -2.42(*) -0.030 -1.79(**)  -0.063  -0.46
Adjusted R2  0.57 0.30  0.15 
F-test fixed effects 1.90(*) 0.98   0.78 
F-test time effects  2.30 (**) 4.29(*)   0.51 
F-test bank fundamentals  6.23 (*) 5.75(*)   2.54(**) 
No. of banks  27 25   20 
No. of observations  135 125   100 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
  
The results pertaining to the interest rate variable is presented in Table 3. The lower the 
quantum of sticky loans, the greater is the compensation required for depositors. In particular, this 
impact is significant for public sector and foreign banks. Bank capitalisation plays a crucial role in 
determining the interest rate paid by private banks: lower the capital levels, larger the interest outgo. 
Interest rate paid by public and private banks are driven by non-interest expenses in the sense that 
lower non-interest expenditures tend to be associated with higher interest outgo. Lower non-interest 
expenses imply lower overhead costs (wage bill, printing and advertisement cost, etc). This, in effect, 
adversely affects customer sentiment regarding the service provided by the bank, so that the bank has 
to perforce pay higher interest rates to attract customers. Earnings are important in explaining 
interest paid by foreign banks. For public sector and foreign banks, size is inversely associated with 
interest rates, probably reflecting the public perception that larger banks have lower probability of 
failure and can afford to pay lower interest rates. Among bank-industry variables, there is limited 
evidence to support contagion effect among public sector banks. The macroeconomic variables play 
an important role in determining interest paid by public sector and private banks: expectedly, lower 
GDP growth is associated with higher interest rates. A volatile economic environment is associated 
with lower interest paid, reflecting consumer preferences to park their funds in bank deposits, 
irrespective of interest paid, in the face of uncertainties. The F-tests show that the bank-specific   13
variables are jointly significant at conventional levels of significance. This, in effect, supports the 
presence of market discipline in the banking sector in India. 
Summing up the foregoing discussion, while bank-specific factors are dominant in case of 
public sector banks, systemic factors, and in particular, policy variable, in addition to bank-specific 
indicators tend to be dominant in case of private banks. For foreign banks, the macroeconomic 
condition tends to overwhelm bank-specific factors in explaining behaviour of depositors. 
Nonetheless, the capital ratio is a key determinant of depositor behaviour for Indian banks, in 
general. Irrespective of the ownership pattern, liquidity plays a significant role in fostering deposit 
growth. In case of state-owned banks, bigger size of banks does not translate into higher deposit 
growth, suggesting that depositors are insensitive to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ effect. For private and 
foreign banks, there exists evidence of contagion effects influencing the deposit accretion process. 
Therefore, we can conclude that there exists market discipline in the Indian banking system. 
 
VI. Some Additional Findings 
Two additional exercises were conducted to test the robustness of the results. First, the study 
sought to empirically examine whether the behaviour of depositors would undergo any change 
consequent upon the introduction of a safety net in the form of deposit insurance. In particular, we 
attempt to distinguish between insured and uninsured depositors. The economic rationale for this 
argument can be stated as follows. Assuming the deposit insurance scheme is credible, one can 
expect insured depositors to have fewer incentives to monitor bank risk-taking. However, if the 
deposit guarantee is not credible or if there are costs associated with the recovery of deposits 
following a bank failure, we may find evidence that insured depositors enforce market discipline. On 
the other hand, uninsured depositors claims are not protected by the deposit guarantee, so, in theory, 
we expect these depositors to withdraw their funds from risky banks. 
  As it stands, the deposit insurance variable is at an aggregate level for different bank-groups. 
This, in essence, implies that the analysis of the impact of a safety net on market discipline can be 
undertaken only for the banking system as a whole and not across bank groups. More particularly, 
the only available variable in this context is the ratio of insured deposits to assessable deposits 
(Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation, various years). The economic significance of 
this ratio lies in the fact that it captures the proportion of overall deposits of the concerned bank 
group covered by deposit guarantee. Illustratively, this figure for nationalised banks in 1996-97 was 
0.778, implying that 77.8 per cent of the deposits of nationalised banks was covered by deposit 
guarantee, leaving 22.2 per cent of the deposits as uninsured.  
Table 4: Response of Growth of Deposits and Interest Rate paid on Deposits  
to Bank Risk Characteristics – Insured versus Uninsured Depositors   14
Dependent Variable: log (time deposit)  Dependent Variable: Interest Rate 
Explanatory Variables  Parameter 
estimate
t-value Explanatory Variables  Parameter 
estimate
t-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bank-specific  Bank-specific 
Intercept 0.513 0.69 Intercept  19.549 3.74 *
Lag (CRAR)  0.009 1.90 ** Lag (CRAR)  -0.045 -1.28
Lag (GNPA)  -0.0001 -0.04 Lag (GNPA)  -0.036 -2.02 **
Lag (MGNT)  -0.015 -1.57 Lag (MGNT)  0.042 0.63
Lag (EARN)  0.014 1.34 Lag (EARN)  -0.232 -3.24 *
Lag (LQD)  -0.019 -2.48 * Lag (LQD)  -0.069 -1.29
Log (SIZE)  -0.069 -3.57 * Log (SIZE)  -0.049 -0.36
DEPINS  -0.001 -0.29 DEPINS  -0.062 -2.33 **
Systemic  Systemic 
CASH 0.254 1.83 ** CASH 0.210 0.21
POLICY 0.178 0.69 POLICY  -0.250 -0.14
Macroeconomic   Macroeconomic  
GDPR 0.336 1.74 ** GDPR  -0.653 -0.48
CPI 0.095 2.50 * CPI  -0.042 -0.16
Adjusted R2  0.32 Adjusted R2  0.41
F-test fixed effects  1.19 F-test fixed effects  1.35 **
F-test time effects  1.67 F-test time effects  0.12
F-test bank fundamentals  3.77 * F-test bank fundamentals  2.96 *
No. of banks  72 No. of banks  72
No. of observations  360 No. of observations  432
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
The result of the empirical analysis is presented in Table 4. The first four columns present 
the results with respect to the quantity variable, whereas the analysis in the subsequent columns 
pertains to the price variable. The results reveal that the quantitative analysis with respect to deposits 
is unaltered. Even the sign of the coefficients in this case are virtually unaffected. This, in effect, 
would mean that deposit insurance seems to exert limited impact on deposit accretion in the banking 
sector. In other words, the disciplining effect of markets in influencing deposit growth is not affected 
by the presence or absence of deposit insurance.  
The results are, however, altered when we consider the price variable. While GNPA and 
earnings variables retain their significance as in Table 1, what is interesting is that the deposit 
insurance variable (DEPINS) turns out to be significant at conventional levels. This would mean that 
insured depositors tend to exercise market discipline on banks not much by withdrawing their 
deposits from banks, but more by compelling them to pay a higher price on their deposits. 
Intuitively, bank deposits in India are perceived as having an implicit Government guarantee in 
comparison to alternate avenues of deployment of resources. Consequently, although depositors tend 
to prefer a low-risk, low-return source of parking their funds (like bank deposits), they tend to 
discipline banks by extracting a higher price on such deposits. This is also evidenced from the data 
which reveals that the share of bank deposits, on average, at around 36 per cent over the period 
1995-96 to 2000-01 constituted the largest source of financial assets of household sector as compared 
to other alternatives like shares and debentures or contractual savings whose average share over the 
same period were around 5 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively (RBI, 2001).   15
The second was the question of divestment, especially in respect of public sector banks3. 
Since the inception of the reforms process, several public sector banks have accessed the capital 
market to augment their capital base with a consequent dilution of Government stake in these banks. 
Accordingly, the study sought to empirically examine whether the divestment of Government 
ownership in these banks has, in any way, impacted the market discipline. Towards this end, we 
constructed a variable (LISTED) defined as follows: the variable undertook a value of 1 in the year in 
which the (public sector) bank made an equity offering and for all subsequent years thereafter; and 
zero, otherwise4. The disadvantage of such a variable is that it does not explicitly factor in the extent 
of divestment. However, to the extent that any divestment process in India is essentially a capital-
raising exercise and not concerned with management logistics (since no public sector bank can divest 
more than 49 per cent), it seems fair to observe that LISTED enables a broad inference of the 
divestment process on market discipline.  
Table 5: Response of Growth of Deposits and Interest Rate to Risk Characteristics of  
Public Sector Banks consequent upon Divestment 




  Parameter Estimate t-value Parameter 
Estimate 
t-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)
Bank-specific   
Intercept 0.512 1.71 9.59  3.82  (*)
Lag (CRAR)  0.005 1.96(**) -0.011  -0.99
Lag (GNPA)  -0.001 -0.66 -0.001  -0.01
Lag (MGNT)  0.029 1.24 -0.358  -2.16 (*)
Lag (EARN)  0.004 0.44 0.027  0.79
Lag (LQD)  -0.006 -1.77(**) 0.018  1.21
Log (SIZE)  -0.013 -1.14 -0.142  -1.27
Systemic   
CASH 0.003 0.37 -0.026  -0.69
YIELD -0.031 -0.90 0.081  0.48
LISTED 0.007 0.33 -0.006  -0.04
Macroeconomic    
GDPR 0.018 0.71 -0.096  -0.59
CPI -0.001 -0.27 -0.023  -1.91(**)
Adjusted R2  0.48 0.57 
F-test fixed effects  2.52(*) 1.74(***) 
F-test time effects  0.64 8.67 (**) 
F-test bank fundamentals  2.71(**) 2.80 (**) 
No. of banks  27 27 
No. of observations  162 162 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 
The re-estimated equation for public sector banks is presented in Table 5. The second 
column pertains to the quantity variable, whereas the fourth column relates to the price variable. As 
can be gleaned from the table, LISTED does not seem to influence either quantity or price variable 
                                                 
3 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
4 Such variable is employed in finance literature, employed particularly in case of ‘event analysis’.    16
in any significant way, attesting to the fact that the divestment process has had limited influence on 
market discipline.5 Given the implicit Government guarantee that these banks enjoy by virtue of their 
state-owned character, it seems that LISTED does not have any perceptible influence on their 
deposits or the interest rate paid thereon. 
VII. Concluding Observations 
  The purpose of the paper has been to examine the existence of market discipline in the 
banking sector in India in the ‘nineties. Towards this end, we employed bank level data to estimate 
reduced form equations, in which the dependent variable (quantity, as proxied by time deposits; 
price, as proxied by implicit interest rate) is modeled as function of bank-specific, systemic and 
macroeconomic variables. 
  Our results enabled us to conclude that depositors in India punish banks for risky behaviour. 
The tests for the joint significance of bank fundamentals were consistently rejected across equations. 
Put differently, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that the bank risk variables were not 
relevant in explaining the behaviour of bank deposits or the interest rate paid on such deposits. This 
provides testimony towards the existence of market discipline in the banking sector in India.  
  Prima facie, the results lend support in favour of regulatory efforts to increase the reliance on 
market discipline to control risk-taking behaviour by banks in the Indian context (for a theoretical 
discussion and empirical evidence regarding attempts on the same in the Argentine banking sector, 
see Calomiris and Powell, 2001). However, there are several caveats regarding the conclusions 
reached in the paper and we venture to point these out for the informed reader.  
First, a more complete test of the existence of market discipline involves understanding 
whether banks respond positively to the signals provided by depositors. Calomiris and Powell (2001) 
explore this issue for the Argentine banking system by testing whether there is a tendency for 
individual banks’ deposit rates to revert to their mean, a behaviour consistent with market discipline; 
if interest rates rise too much (i.e., fundamentals fall out of line), then banks must take corrective 
action to ensure that interest rates fall again. This ‘mean reversion’ aspect is beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
Second, as pointed out by Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001), we have not identified the 
specific channels through which depositors obtain information regarding bank fundamentals. 
Depositors might access such information from a variety of sources: bank balance sheet, newspaper 
articles, internet or even from financial advisors. The differential access to these different sources 
might shed light on what mechanisms promote more efficient market discipline.  
Third, owing to paucity of data on data on deposits according to different size classes or 
according to insured versus uninsured deposits at the bank-level, we are unable to study the behaviour 
                                                 
5 Owing to certain estimation problems arising from the inclusion of the variable POLICY, the same was excluded from the estimation process.   17
of these two classes of depositors in isolation or even whether the behaviour of these two classes 
differs across bank groups. This would constitute a crucial aspect of the study regarding the inter-
linkage between market discipline with deposit insurance. Alternately, since larger depositors have a 
larger amount of funds at risk, their deposits might probably represent a smaller proportion of their 
wealth, implying the possibility of differential behaviour by small versus large depositors in exerting 
market discipline on different bank groups. This is expected to be important, since in India, foreign 
banks maintain a minimum balance stipulation for maintaining an account, which is several times the 
multiple of what the public sector banks stipulate (Mathur, 2002).  
Finally, the quantity variable employed in the study is the first difference of the natural 
logarithm of time deposits, whereas the price variable is the implicit interest rate paid on all deposits. 
It would have been useful, in the absence of bank-wise data on deposit interest rate paid across the 
entire spectrum of deposits, to proxy the implicit interest rate paid by the interest expenses on time 
deposits alone to total deposits. Data constraints however prevent from taking such finer classification 
of the implicit interest rate paid into account. 
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